Perception of time in the context of action


 

Carola Häring, Andrea Kiesel, Joachim Hoffmann


If an action reliably produces an effect after a short time interval, the action is perceived later and the effect is perceived earlier than identical key presses that do not produce effects or identical stimuli without preceding action (e.g. Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, & Prinz, 2002). These biases in time perception are attributed to intentional binding, that is, in the context of action the action and the effect get bound leading to closer temporal perception of both events.
Using a psychophysical method, we have gained first evidence that in the context of action the time interval between action and effect is estimated shorter than it actually is. This shortened perception occurs however not exclusively after freely chosen actions but also after reactions to imperative stimuli. We now explore if our results can be explained by intentional binding or if other possible explanations apply. In a next step we will elaborate several alternative explanations to intention as the crucial factor for this shortened perception, like the perceived causality between two events. Furthermore we want to examine if the specificity of an effect is decisive for the shortened perception of the interval between action and effect.



Updated: 10.07.2009