

# Punishers are evaluated **better** when using **psychological** punishment, **weaker** punishment, and when being **equal in rank** as the perpetrator.


THE EVALUATION OF THIRD-PARTY PUNISHMENT DEPENDS ON TYPE, SEVERITY, AND INTERPERSONAL HIERARCHY

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## MAIN QUESTION

- ▶ Third parties (uninvolved people) invest own resources to punish perpetrators [1-3]
- ▶ Is the evaluation of the third party shaped by ...
  - ▶ **the punitive act**, e.g., the type of punishment (Exp.1) and its severity (Exp.2)?
  - ▶ **the relation between the parties**, e.g., the hierarchy between the punisher and the perpetrator (Exp.3)?



## METHODS


- ▶ Vignette approach (instead of economic game paradigm [4])
- ▶ 24 newly created and validated written scenarios
- ▶ Participants rated punishment and punisher on 5 rating scales

Read vignette	Rate
Picture the following scenario:	adequacy
A handball player mocks his teammate's cheap sportswear. In response, a third player tears the keychain off the offender's keyring.	warmth & competence [5]
	interaction tendency


## DISCUSSION

- ▶ Naturalistic vignette paradigm
- ▶ Psychological punishers are preferred over property-oriented punishers
- ▶ Proportionality (same type, same rank) matters: sense of justice and fairness


## EXPERIMENT 1 (N = 48)



## EXPERIMENT 2 (N = 48)



## EXPERIMENT 3 (N = 49)





## ADDITIONAL RESULTS

### Exp.1:

- ▶ **Alignment effects:** Type of transgression only matters when it is congruent to type of subsequent punishment: Better evaluations when transgression and punishment are of the same type

### All Experiments:

- ▶ **Mediation analyses:** Impact of type of punishment (psychological vs. property-oriented) on interaction tendency reduced when including evaluations of the punisher's warmth/competence into the model, suggesting partial mediation, e.g., **Exp.2:**



[1] Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 25(2), 63–87. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138\(04\)00005-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4)

[2] Batistoni, T., Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. J. (2022). Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game. *Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 289(1966), 20211773. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.1773>

[3] Raihani, N. J., Thornton, A., & Bshary, R. (2012). Punishment and cooperation in nature. *Trends in Ecology & Evolution*, 27(5), 288–295. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004>

[4] Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. *Nature*, 415, 137–140. <https://doi.org/10.1038/415137a>

[5] Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as universal dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model and the BIAS map. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 40, 61–149. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(07\)00002-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(07)00002-0)