


The participant witnesses the norm violation...



... and can subsequently intervene (punish or compensate). The participant then specifies how many chips from their own endowment they wish to invest.

## Visual identifiability, transgression severity, and behavioral disposition influence third-party intervention preferences, but gaze behavior, facial expression, and written information do not.

### MAIN QUESTION

Witnessing social norm violations can trigger costly actions from unaffected observers: **third-party punishment**, that is, inflicting a reciprocal cost on the unfair offender [1], & **third-party compensation**, that is, investing own resources to compensate the victim [2]. The inclination for either action depends on various factors.

Perspective of information processing: Cognitively foregrounding the offender (via explicit instructions) can increase punishment rates, while foregrounding the victim can promote compensation [3]. At the same time, subtle contextual, task-irrelevant cues can alter cognitive engagement with offender/victim and subsequent third-party decisions, e.g., selective information provision (by revealing only one party's payoff [4] or making one target more concrete [5-6]).


*Does selectively providing visual social cues - in form of portrait photos of the involved characters and some of their features - change how individuals cognitively engage with the situation and whom they feel compelled to act for?*

### METHODS

Incentivized third-party justice game: In each trial, all three parties are endowed with 200 chips. Person A steals chips from a passive victim B. The participant can then decide to use a certain amount of own chips to punish A or compensate B. The experimental trials vary according to key factors (Exp 1: photo of either A or B, direct vs. averted gaze; Exp 2: photos of both A and B, direct vs. averted gaze; Exp 3: photo of either A or B, neutral vs. sad emotional expression; Exp 4: no photo but name+fact of either A or B).

Additional factor was transgression severity (~100 vs. ~25 of 200 chips). We controlled for the third party's personality traits (justice sensitivity and empathic concern) and their baseline behavior (two baseline trials per experiment).

### RESULTS & DISCUSSION



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