



The participant witnesses the norm violation...



... and can subsequently intervene (punish or compensate). The participant then specifies how many chips from their own endowment they wish to invest.

## Visual identifiability, transgression severity, and behavioral disposition influence third-party preferences, but gaze behavior, facial expression, and written information do not.

Witnessing social norm violations can trigger costly actions from unaffected observers  
 → **third-party punishment**: inflicting a reciprocal cost on the unfair offender [1-2]  
 → **third-party compensation**: investing own resources to compensate the victim [3]

### Perspective of information processing:

- Cognitively foregrounding the offender (via explicit instructions) can increase punishment rates, while foregrounding the victim can promote compensation [4]
- Selective information provision (e.g., by revealing only one party's payoff [5] or making one target more concrete [6]) influences decision-making

**Does providing visual social cues – in the form of portrait photos of the involved characters and some of their features – change how individuals cognitively engage with the situation and whom they feel compelled to act for?**


### Incentivized third-party justice game:

In each trial, all three parties are endowed with 200 chips. Person A steals chips from a passive victim B. The participant can then decide to use own chips to punish A or compensate B. The experimental trials vary according to key factors (i.e., social cues).

### Additional factors:

- transgression severity (~100 chips vs. ~25 chips)
- controlling for personality traits (justice sensitivity and empathic concern)
- controlling for baseline behavior (two baseline trials per experiment)

### RESULTS & DISCUSSION



*N=96, M<sub>age</sub>=27.6, m=57, f=39*  
 Visibility of A led to more punishment, visibility of B led to more compensation  
 Subtle gaze cues overshadowed by face saliency?  
 Punishment propensity depended on severity

*N=115, M<sub>age</sub>=30.4, m=53, f=59, d=1*  
 Direct (vs. averted) gaze did not influence decisions (but amount of chips invested for compensation)  
 Punishment and compensation propensity depended on severity

*N=112, M<sub>age</sub>=35.1, m=48, f=62, d=2*  
 Replication of visibility effect  
 Facial expression did not influence decisions  
 Punishment propensity depended on severity

*N=112, M<sub>age</sub>=29.3, m=52, f=58, d=2*  
 Identifiability via written info did not influence decisions  
 Punishment propensity depended on severity  
 In all Exps, baseline behavior predicted later behavior

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 [2] Van Dijk, E., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2021). Experimental games and social decision making. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 72(1), 415–438. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-081420-110718>  
 [3] Chavez, A. K., & Bicchieri, C. (2013). Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum game. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 39, 268–277. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.004>  
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 [5] Civai, C., Capraro, V., & Polonio, L. (2025). The role of attention and frames on third-party punishment and compensation choices. *Cognition*, 263, 106192. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106192>  
 [6] Genevsky, A., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., & Knutson, B. (2013). Neural underpinnings of the IVE: Affect shifts preferences for giving. *The Journal of Neuroscience*, 33(43), 17188–17196. <https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2348-13.2013>